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VISIBILITY AND INDIVISIBILITY IN
RESOURCE ARRANGEMENTS
LEE ANNE FENNELL*
Projects like highways, bridges, pipelines, and wildlife corridors
exhibit indivisibilities—we need the whole thing to have anything of
value. Many environmental and social goals have a similar all-ornothing character: staying above or below a certain critical threshold
can make all the difference. This essay focuses on the role of visibility
in addressing resource dilemmas that have this structure. I examine
how two kinds of visibility can help avoid catastrophic consequences
and advance desirable ones. The first involves recognizing when an
indivisibility is present—that is, appreciating the vulnerability of
resources to thresholds and cliff effects before it is too late. The second
involves seeing how individual decisions about resources stack
together to generate outcomes. When a resource problem suffers from
poor visibility along these dimensions, finding ways to clear the view
can improve the prospects for cooperative solutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION

What we can see changes what we can do. The intuition is
simple, but its implications are profound. Nowhere is this more
true than in environmental, land use, and natural resource
contexts, where collective action problems abound but their
shapes—and those of their solutions—often remain obscure. This
essay emphasizes the role of visibility in taking on these challenges.1
By visibility, I mean two distinct things: perceiving the structure of
a given resource dilemma, and seeing how dispersed individual
choices influence it.2
Seeing a resource dilemma’s structure means more than
recognizing the existence of a problem worth addressing—often a
challenge in its own right.3 It also means apprehending whether the
problem has an all-or-nothing character, exhibits cliff or threshold
effects, or involves increasing or decreasing returns to scale.
Features like these are associated with indivisibilities—instances
in which a given good is very costly to divide or is much less valuable
when divided than when kept whole.4 Highways, bridges, pipelines,
1. The significance of visibility in environmental and other collective action contexts
has long been recognized. See, e.g., Robert C. Cass & Julian J. Edney, The Commons Dilemma:
A Simulation Testing the Effects of Resource Visibility and Territorial Division, 6 HUM. ECOL.
371 (1978); Bonnie J. McCay, Everyone’s Concern; No One’s Responsibility: A Review of
Discourse on the Commons, conference draft, Annual Meeting of the Society for Applied
Anthropology, 10–11 (1984); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to
Governing the Commons, 30 ENV’T. L. 241, 242–43, 265 (2000); Monika Ehrman, Application
of Natural Resources Property Theory to Hidden Resources, 14 INT’L. J. COMMONS 627 (2020).
2. These two kinds of visibility track distinctions about information conditions in the
game theory literature. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 9–10 (1994). Whether a game’s structure—its payoffs and
available strategies—are known to the players determines whether the game is one of
complete or incomplete information. Id. at 10. Whether the strategies or “moves” actually
selected by the other players are observable determines whether the game is one of perfect or
imperfect information. Id. If both structures and choices are known to the parties, the game
is one of complete and perfect information. Id. The notion of visibility pursued in this paper
focuses on how the information environment for a strategic interaction might be improved
along these two dimensions.
3. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 1, at 258–59 (noting that fisheries, groundwater,
and climate change “[a]ll involve hidden resources,” which can lead people to ignore or
downplay problems); Kate Pride Brown, Water, Water Everywhere (Or Seeing Is Believing):
The Visibility of Water Supply and the Public Will for Conservation, 12 NATURE & CULTURE
219, 224–25, 235 (2017) (discussing problems of groundwater invisibility); see generally
ARDEN ROWELL & KENWORTHEY BILZ, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2021)
(discussing factors that make environmental harms difficult to see, understand, and care
about).
4. See H. Peyton Young, Dividing the Indivisible, 38 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 904, 904, 906
(1995) (observing that the notion of indivisibility does not generally refer to the literal
impossibility of division, but rather to the cost or loss of value associated with splitting
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and wildlife corridors have an indivisible character—one needs the
entire thing in order to have much of value. Similar indivisibilities
lurk in environmental goods (or bads)5 that depend on aggregations
or accumulations—the minimum viable population required to
sustain a species, for example, or the critical threshold that a
pollutant concentration cannot exceed without devastating effects.
In other words, there is often a “lumpy” rather than smoothly linear
relationship between inputs and outcomes.6 Recognizing the shape
of the problem is essential to solving it.
Seeing the impact of individual choices on a resource dilemma
requires another type of visibility—apprehending how innumerable
small, dispersed, interacting decisions stack together to produce
real-world impacts. In some contexts, the way that individual
decisions aggregate is easy to track and view. For example, if a
particular string of land parcels is necessary to create a wildlife
corridor, each of the owners along that path holds an essential
element. But in many environmental contexts, the effects of human
choices are diffuse, mobile, and sometimes literally invisible. The
inability to get real-time feedback about choices and their effects can
thwart attempts at coordination. Nonetheless, we can consciously
construct focal points and ways of visualizing cumulative impacts,
even when these are not naturally part of the observable landscape.7
This essay proceeds in three stages. Part II discusses how
indivisibility changes the nature of a collective action problem and
upends the predictions that might follow from a tragedy of the
commons template. Part III examines the structure of resource
dilemmas that feature indivisibility. Understanding this structure,
and recognizing how it influences the strategies of the players, is an
important first step in addressing resource dilemmas that involve
thresholds, cliff effects, or lumpy all-or-nothing outcomes. Part IV
turns to the role of visibility in compiling the cooperation necessary
to resolve indivisible problems.
The analytic building blocks that I use in this piece are familiar
to those working on collective action problems using economics
and game theory. What I hope to do here is show how these ideas
apply to environmental and natural resource contexts, where
indivisibilities typically loom large and visibility is often low. The
something up).
5. See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 61–62 (1982) (defining “collective
bads”). Collective action problems in environmental contexts often involve the avoidance of
“bads” as well as the provision of “goods.”
6. See LEE ANNE FENNELL, SLICES AND LUMPS: DIVISION AND AGGREGATION IN LAW
AND LIFE 9–26 (2019); Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods:
Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350, 353 (1982).
7. See infra Part IV.C.
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indivisibilities in these contexts can threaten great harm, such as
the total collapse of a fishery. But they also represent
underappreciated sources of opportunity, because they change the
game from one in which everyone does best by defecting to one in
which each player’s best strategy depends on what she expects
others to do. Forming expectations can be difficult, however,
because environmental and natural resource problems often suffer
from poor visibility—their shapes are ill-defined and contributions
to addressing them are often unobservable. Finding ways to clear
the view can help avoid catastrophic results, but because it may also
enable some parties to take advantage of others (and cause others
to fear being suckered), norms retain an important role in
supporting cooperative action.
II. UNDERSTANDING INDIVISIBILITY
When most people think about problems involving resources, the
tragedy of the commons springs immediately to mind.8 The standard
story tells us that herders with access to a common pasture will tend
to overgraze it because they internalize all of the benefits of putting
more livestock into the field but bear only a fraction of the costs that
are visited on the pasture when they do so.9 The mental template is
a powerful one with a memorable, clear, and ultra-depressing
prediction: that everyone will pursue an individually rational, but
socially destructive, dominant strategy.10
Fortunately, reality rarely resembles this model. Social norms,
repeat play, and other factors often intervene to change the payoffs
that people face and hence the strategies that they will pursue.
Elinor Ostrom’s work explored many of the design features through
which local institutions can avert tragedy in managing common pool

8. This framework is often associated with Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE, n.s.1243 (1968). The roots of the idea reach back much further. See,
e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 2–3 (1990) (discussing antecedents, including in the work of Aristotle);
H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J.
POL. ECON. 124, 128–35 (1954) (analyzing common pool resource problems in fisheries and
noting parallels in other resource contexts).
9. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35, 35–41 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E.
Smith, eds., 2011) (discussing and critiquing this account).
10. See, e.g., id.
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resources.11 In this Part, I focus on a structural reason why many
resource dilemmas look nothing like the standard tragedy of the
commons: the presence of indivisibilities.
A. What Indivisibility Means
Bridges, pipelines, and highways offer intuitive examples of
indivisible goods. Although it would be physically possible to divide
them up or remove segments from them, doing so would have a
disproportionately negative impact on their value.12 A ten-meter
segment of a kilometer-long bridge only represents one percent of
the span’s total length, but removing it leaves behind something
that is not 99% as good, but rather utterly worthless, at least as a
bridge.13 Even where it’s trivially easy to remove an integral part—
one card from a deck, one piece from a jigsaw puzzle, or one cog from
a machine—doing so would destroy value because those goods are
designed to work as indivisible wholes. Note also that indivisibility
applies conceptually even when the whole has not yet been realized:
stopping construction of a bridge when it is 99% complete defeats
the purpose of building the bridge altogether, because bridges are
useful only in whole-bridge units.14
Many environmental resources and problems lack the
concreteness of a bridge or a jigsaw puzzle but share a similarly
indivisible structure—taking away a portion of the resource, or
failing to supply an element necessary to its continuing viability,
can have catastrophic effects. Sometimes this all-or-nothing
structure is just as evident as it is for any highway or bridge.
Consider, for instance, the Path of the Pronghorn, a designated
migratory route between Wyoming’s Green River Valley and Grand
11. See generally, OSTROM, supra note 8. Although these small-scale solutions may be
successful in preventing the destruction of the common pool resource, it is worth emphasizing
that some of them can embed oppression, hierarchy, and self-dealing—as Ostrom herself
recognized. See, e.g., Duncan Law & Nicole Pepperell, Oppression in the Commons:
Cautionary Notes on Elinor Ostrom’s Concept of Self-Governance, in The Australian
Sociological Association (TASA) 2018 Conference Proceedings: Precarity, Rights, and
Resistance 7 (Grazyna Zajdow, ed., 2018) (discussing passages in Ostrom’s writing that
recognize such risks); Carol M. Rose, Thinking About the Commons, 14 INT’L J. COMMONS
557, 561 (2020) (observing that “many traditional communities are shot through with layers
of hierarchy, and especially with norms about gender roles.”).
12. See Young, supra note 4, at 906.
13. Dismantling it (at some cost) would yield only scrap materials. Cf. CHARLES R.
FRANK, JR., PRODUCTION THEORY AND INDIVISIBLE COMMODITIES 32 (1969) (illustrating
indivisibility by observing that splitting up “an industrial heat exchanger with a two-millionton capacity” yields “two piles of steel scrap and other debris,” not “two heat exchangers with
a capacity of a million tons apiece”).
14. See Taylor & Ward, supra note 6, at 353 (noting that goods like bridges “cannot be
usefully provided in any amounts but only in more or less massive ‘lumps’”).
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Teton National Park.15 Protecting a contiguous path requires a
series of highway underpasses and overpasses as well as careful
attention to the hundreds of fences the pronghorn encounter along
the way.16 Even one unnavigable segment would thwart the annual
migration and threaten the pronghorn’s survival—a point central to
a petition recently filed in federal district court to challenge the
Bureau of Land Management’s decision to permit gas wells along
the route.17 Indivisibility changes the stakes and the nature of the
dispute: the alleged disruption is not simply a small fraction of an
animal’s wide-ranging territory, but rather an essential segment of
a larger whole.18
As this example suggests, whether a given resource problem is
viewed as exhibiting indivisibilities is itself open to interpretation
and construction. The answer depends not just on physical realities
(the interconnectedness of nature, or the effects of gravity on cars
trying to cross an incomplete bridge) but also on how we define the
relevant goal, and what counts as success or failure in achieving it.19
For example, what might seem like just a marginal diminution
in wildlife overall takes on an all-or-nothing character if we focus
on preventing the extinction of a particular species. Reframing
problems in ways that emphasize indivisibilities can raise the
stakes (e.g., make the situation an all-or-nothing one) and,
potentially, help harness cooperation.20
Indivisibilities lurking in some resource systems may be difficult
to detect. For example, if a fishery requires a certain minimum
population level for a given species to remain sustainable, fishing
that drops the breeding population below that level will eliminate

15. See, e.g., MARY ELLEN HANNIBAL, THE SPINE OF THE CONTINENT: THE RACE TO SAVE
AMERICA’S LAST, BEST WILDERNESS 204–06 (paperback ed., 2013); Paul Tolmé, Running the
Gauntlet, in Conservation, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N (June 1, 2019) https://www.nwf.org/
Magazines/National-Wildlife/2019/June-July/Conservation/Habitat-Corridors.
16. See Tolmé, supra note 15. Pronghorn do not jump fences, so they need to be able to
go under any fences across their route. See HANNIBAL, supra note 15, at 205.
17. Amended Petition for Review of Agency Action, Upper Green River All. v. U.S.
Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 2:19-cv-146-SWS (D. Wyo., Feb. 19, 2020). See Cassidy Randall,
“They Won’t Survive”: Trump Gas Wells Would Block Pronghorn Migration Route, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 24, 2020.
18. For more background on the ecology of wildlife corridors and the significance of
connectivity, see generally, JODI A. HILTY ET AL., CORRIDOR ECOLOGY: LINKING LANDSCAPES
FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND CLIMATE ADAPTATION (2d ed. 2019).
19. Of course, there may be foundational normative disagreements about the ends to
be sought or the evaluative framework to be employed in assessing progress. For instance,
conservation might be sought for reasons wholly unrelated to human welfare. The visibility
analysis developed here does not require or rule out any particular way of defining goals, and
the examples I give are meant to be illustrative rather than prescriptive.
20. See infra Part II.B.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3870832

Spring, 2021

VISIBILITY AND INDIVISIBILITY

7

that species from the resource system—a dramatic collapse.21 But
such a population crash often follows some period in which
exploitation of the resource has little or no perceptible negative
effect.22 As Carol Rose puts it, “it is typical of environmental
problems that they really are not problems at the outset.”23
Moreover, even after declines become observable, they may be
deceptive—there may be a period during which the decline is fairly
modest and unalarming. But the losses may begin to snowball
rapidly as the critical mass necessary to sustain the population is
broken apart through overextraction. Similar threshold effects
exist in multiple environmental contexts: coral reefs can suffer
devastating collapses when contaminants or temperatures reach a
certain critical level; small ocean temperature changes can trigger
a dramatic increase in hurricanes.24
In cases like these, indivisibilities exist and strongly influence
the potential for disastrous outcomes. But they may remain largely
invisible to observers—until it is too late. A tragic example of this
phenomenon can be found in the fate of the passenger pigeon, which
was at one time the most common bird in North America, with
massive flocks darkening the skies and populations numbering in
the billions.25 But intensive hunting quickly drove the passenger
pigeon to extinction; the last surviving member of the species,
Martha, died in the Cincinnati Zoo in 1914.26 Because the passenger
pigeon was a migratory species, it was only present intermittently
in any given place, and because its evolutionary strategy was to
form large flocks to evade predators, the birds always appeared in
great quantity. There was no way to gauge their decline, and, just
as important, no way to connect individual acts of groups of hunters
to any particular increment of depletion.
The need for a critical mass of passenger pigeons to carry on
the species made the problem a “lumpy” or indivisible one;
once exploitation of the resource crossed a critical threshold, the
21. See, e.g., Taylor & Ward, supra note 6, at 353 (describing and depicting possible
paths for such a collapse).
22. See, e.g., id. (“Ecological systems such as lakes, rivers, the atmosphere, fisheries
and so on can normally be exploited up to some critical level while largely maintaining their
integrity and retaining much of their use value. If exploitation rates go beyond that critical
level, use value falls catastrophically.”).
23. Carol M. Rose, Evolution of Property Rights, 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 93, 96 (Peter Newman, ed., 1998).
24. See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 11–14 (2004)
(discussing “all or nothing” threshold effects in environmental contexts and citing these
examples).
25. See generally, JOEL GREENBERG, A FEATHERED RIVER ACROSS THE SKY: THE
PASSENGER PIGEON’S FLIGHT TO EXTINCTION (2014).
26. See id. at xii.
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population collapsed irretrievably. The problem was one of low
visibility. This was true in both of the senses to be explored in this
essay: the shape of the collective action problem was opaque, as was
the way that individual acts aggregated to impact the outcome.
There was no real-time feedback as hunting proceeded, and hence
no way to calibrate the intensity of harvesting to align with
sustainable levels. There was also no incentive to do so. Without any
way to coordinate with the other hunters, any individual’s acts of
forbearance would be meaningless; someone else would take up the
slack. Better visibility could have made it possible to see, and
pursue, a cooperative solution.
It is easy to chalk up the fate of the passenger pigeon to a tragedy
of the commons, and to blame the birds’ extinction on the lack of
property rights or inadequate government regulation.27 But this
misses the fact that a cooperative solution might have become
possible if only the participants could have seen more clearly what
was going on. The ability to monitor and trace the impact of
individual actions, always important in contexts involving collective
goods or commonly owned resources,28 takes on special significance
where indivisibilities are concerned. The reason relates to the ways
in which the presence of indivisibilities alters the structure of a
collective action problem and changes the prospects for cooperative
action. The next section explains.
B. Beyond the Tragedy of the Commons
The standard tragedy of the commons story predicts that people
with access to common pool resources will act in a manner that is
individually rational but socially harmful—they will “defect” by
doing the selfish thing, rather than “cooperate.” But that result
depends on a set of quite specific assumptions, as becomes clear in
examining the tragedy’s two-person structural equivalent—the
single-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD).29

27. See OSTROM, supra note 8, at 8–14 (1990) (critiquing commentators who argue that
either “Leviathan” or privatization represent “the only way” to solve a commons dilemma).
28. Id. at 45, 94–100 (discussing the importance of monitoring in common resource
settings); Steven J. Karau & Kipling D. Williams, Social Loafing: A Meta-Analytic Review
and Theoretical Integration, J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 681, 683, 696, 700 (1993) (assessing
studies examining how the ability to identify and evaluate individual contributions (including
self-evaluation) can reduce “loafing” on group tasks).
29. Scholars have often noted the structural equivalence between the Prisoners’
Dilemma and the tragedy of the commons. See Rose supra note 11, at 564 (crediting Russell
Hardin with the original insight and noting that it “is now a widely-accepted view”) (citing
Russell Hardin, Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoners’ Dilemma, 16 BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE 472 (1971)); see also OSTROM, supra note 8, at 3–5; BAIRD ET AL., supra note 2, at 34.
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The titular PD setup is one in which two prisoners, interrogated
separately, each have the choice to cooperate (with each other) by
remaining silent, or defect (by confessing).30 If both confess, they
both receive moderate sentences, say three years. If they both stay
silent, they both receive short sentences, say one year. But if one
confesses and the other stays silent, the confessor goes free and the
silent one goes to prison for a long time, say seven years. Focusing
solely on the prison consequences, each prisoner would rationally
choose to confess no matter what the other person does. If the other
person will stay silent, it is better to confess (going free versus one
year), and if the other person will confess, it is still better to confess
(three years versus seven).
Under these conditions, and assuming no repeat play, binding
contracts, social norms, or extra-legal consequences, there is a
single equilibrium outcome: mutual defection.31 The same analysis
holds if we translate the story into a resource context where
defecting involves overharvesting or polluting, and cooperating
involves refraining from these actions—so long as one always does
better defecting regardless of what the other players in the story do.
Public goods games in which contributions are multiplied and
distributed evenly to the players epitomize this structure; as long as
the “multiplier” is smaller than the number of players, each player
does best by defecting and contributing nothing, regardless of what
anyone else does.32 However, researchers have found that few
situations, inside or outside the lab, match the payoff structure
specified by the PD game.33 As a result, the analyses that flow from
it are unlikely to track real-world resource dilemmas.34 There are
30. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams, Inversion Aversion, 86 U. CHI.
L. REV. 797, 807–08 (2019) (presenting and describing a standard PD game matrix with the
payoff structure detailed here).
31. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma Coordination, Game
Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 212 (2009). The mutual defection solution is a Nash
equilibrium, named after John Nash, which describes a set of strategies in which no player
can do better given the strategies of the other players. See id. at 212 n.9 (citing BAIRD ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 310).
32. See Pamela Oliver et al., A Theory of the Critical Mass. I. Interdependence, Group
Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action, 91 AM. J. SOC. 522, 540 (1985)
(explaining that under such conditions, “predictions about others’ behavior are irrelevant, for
contributions are irrational no matter what other people do”). If, on the other hand, the
multiplier is larger than the number of players, there is a different dominant strategy:
everyone will contribute everything they have, regardless of what anyone else does. See id. at
533–34 (explaining that when production functions are linear, the slope determines which of
two patterns will prevail: “[e]veryone will contribute either everything possible or nothing”).
33. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 31; Glenn W. Harrison & Jack Hirshleifer, An
Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods, 97 J. POL. ECON.
201, 201–02 (1989).
34. See, e.g., Fennell & McAdams, supra note 30, at 807–10 (discussing and citing
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many reasons for this divergence, but the one of interest here is the
indivisibility of the good or goal, which keeps any party from
enjoying a positive payoff unless enough people cooperate.
When indivisibilities are present, the game differs markedly
from the one suggested by the PD or tragedy of the commons
template. Two other game theory templates are especially relevant,
both evocatively named: the Stag Hunt (also called the Assurance
Game), and Chicken (also called the Hawk-Dove Game).35 The Stag
Hunt story, based on a passage from Rousseau, involves two hunters
who must choose whether to cooperate with each other to bring
down a deer or defect by hunting rabbits individually.36 The deer is
a much better food source for the pair than the rabbits they can hunt
on their own, but it is impossible for either of them to bag it alone.37
A deer kill is an indivisible event; it is not helpful to halfway hunt a
deer.38 As a result, neither hunter wants to go deer hunting on her
own; doing so would leave her hungry at the end of a wasted day. If
the other hunter is not going to help bag a deer, rabbit hunting is
her best bet. Here, the two hunters do best if they can be sure both
will cooperate; with that assurance in place, they are not tempted
(as they are in the PD game) to defect.39
This game setup illustrates the effects of indivisibility, but it
diverges from most environmental or resource dilemmas in other
respects. In the two-person Stag Hunt game, each of the two players
is necessary to bring down the lumpy ungulate, and the payoffs are
symmetric. In most real-world situations, however, some degree of
cooperation is needed to achieve an indivisible goal, but usually
unanimous cooperation is not essential, and payoffs vary because

literature on this point); OSTROM, supra note 8, at 33–30 (criticizing the assumption that all
collective action problems are Prisoners’ Dilemmas); McAdams, supra note 31 (describing
widespread overuse and misuse of the Prisoners’ Dilemma framework by legal academics).
35. See, e.g., Taylor & Ward, supra note 6; McAdams, supra note 31. There are minor
variations, not relevant here, between certain versions of the Assurance Game and the Stag
Hunt. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the
Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 392 nn.39–40 (1998); see also Amartya K. Sen,
Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount, 81 Q.J. ECON. 112, 114–15 (1967)
(formulating the “Assurance Problem”).
36. See EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 121 n.15 (1977)
(quoting JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 349 (G.D.H. Cole trans.
1952)).
37. See id. at 121 (quoting DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 7
(1969).
38. See Kristen Hawkes, Sharing and Collective Action, in EVOLUTIONARY ECOLOGY
AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 269, 288 (Eric Alden Smith & Bruce Winterhalder, eds., 1992)
(“Hunters cannot bring down part of a giraffe.”); LEWIS, supra note 37, at 7 (“[I]f even one of
us deserts the stag hunt to catch a rabbit, the stag will get away; so the other stag hunters
will not eat unless they desert too.”).
39. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 31, at 221.
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different people need not all contribute the same amount of money,
materials, or effort. In these cases, a second strategic interaction
comes into play: Chicken.40
Chicken is named for a hazardous driving game in which two
foolhardy motorists are set on a head-on collision course and one (or
both) must swerve to avoid catastrophe.41 A player can lose the game
by swerving, but both players lose far worse by crashing. Each
player would rather drive straight and win out over the swerver, yet
she cannot safely do so unless she expects her opponent to swerve.42
A crash is an indivisible event, a bad shared by all who experience
it, and everyone has an interest in keeping it from happening.
Dealmaking often features this dynamic—the worst outcome is the
total loss of the surplus from completing the deal (a kind of crash),
but each party wants more of that surplus.43
Putting the two games together, we can see that often there is a
Chicken game in progress about who will cooperate to bring down
the metaphorical stag in the story—the indivisible good that can be
enjoyed only with enough cooperation.44 Everyone loses if the stag
is not brought down, but the ones who lose the most are those who
chose the cooperative strategy only to go hungry. Everyone wins if
the stag is brought down (assuming that sharing is required, or that
it’s impossible to exclude people from the spoils), but those who win
the most are those who did not contribute anything to its demise
(assuming unanimous participation is not required to bag the stag).
Indivisibilities change the collective action problem from one in
which the dominant strategy is to defect, no matter what anyone
else does, to one in which one’s own best strategy depends crucially
on what one expects others to do. In game theory jargon, there
are multiple equilibria:45 players may cooperate and achieve
the indivisible good, or things may fall apart entirely due to
miscalculations, lapses in communication, or strategic behavior.

40. See, e.g., Taylor & Ward, supra note 6.
41. See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 2, at 44.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 43–44.
44. See Hawkes, supra note 38, at 289 (“If there are more potential participants than
the minimum required, however, games of Chicken arise over who shall complete the working
group.”); Taylor & Ward, supra note 6, at 357–58 (describing how Chicken and Assurance
games interact in a fishing scenario where not everyone’s cooperation is required); Hugh
Ward, Three Men in a Boat, Two Must Row: An Analysis of a Three-Person Chicken Pregame,
J. CONFLICT RES. 371 (1990) (discussing Chicken pre-games in which parties vie to precommit
to not contribute to a lumpy good that does not require everyone’s contributions).
45. See McAdams, supra note 31, at 212.
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Recognizing that expectations determine actions and outcomes
shifts the emphasis to how people form expectations about how
others will act.46
III. STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY
Indivisibility is a game changer. Defecting is no longer the single
dominant strategy; cooperation may be rational depending on what
others will do. But players faced with indivisible resource problems
may still act as if they are trapped in a tragedy of the commons.47 A
core problem is the inability to observe or predict the choices that
other people will make.48 More foundationally, however, the terms
of the game itself may be unclear. In this Part, I examine the
structural features of indivisible resource problems and show how
these features—and differences among them—influence the
strategies of the players.
A. Anatomy of a Collective Action Problem
The Stag Hunt and Chicken games both provide an intuitive
sense of why indivisibility matters to cooperation: everyone stands
to lose unless enough players choose the cooperative strategy. Realworld resource dilemmas are, of course, far more complex than these
simple two-player games. We can further refine our understanding
of collective action problems involving indivisibilities by focusing
on three defining features: production functions, participation
requirements, and payoffs.49
1. Production Functions
A production function is simply a way of capturing the
relationship between inputs and outcomes in producing a particular
good or bad.50 Suppose we want to create a migration pathway.
What happens to the value of the pathway as each incremental
46. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–58 (1960); Robert B.
Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV.
578, 618–19 (2010).
47. See HARDIN, supra note 5, at 57–59 (discussing several reasons why the universal
defection outcome associated with the PD might occur even when step goods are involved).
48. See id. at 58–59 (describing the situation in which “members of a group must choose
when they have deficient knowledge of how others are choosing”).
49. See FENNELL, supra note 6, at 47–49.
50. See Oliver et al., supra note 32 (describing and depicting various production
functions for public goods).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3870832

Spring, 2021

VISIBILITY AND INDIVISIBILITY

13

segment is added? If the pathway is only useful when it is complete
(perhaps because it is essential that the animals using it be able to
move between habitat patches located at each end),51 then nothing
happens to the value of the pathway as each segment is added, until
the final piece is put in place. Graphically, value follows a flat line
until it suddenly jumps up in a large single step when the last
segment is added and the path is completed.52
By contrast, a linear production function provides proportionate
benefits as inputs are contributed. Think of a parking meter where
adding each coin buys a proportionately calibrated unit of parking
time, or a soup kitchen where each marginal ladle-full delivers a
roughly equivalent nutritional benefit to an additional person. It is
possible to quibble with all of these examples: even a partial wildlife
corridor might provide some habitat benefits, people often need to
park for discrete chunks of time, and soup production usually
involves economies of scale. More generally, few if any goods involve
a literal single step of value or exhibit a fully linear production
function. Many production functions follow a more complex path
that combines steps with slopes or contains regions of increasing or
decreasing returns—or some of each.53
It may also be unclear what production function best describes
observed phenomena. For example, we may be uncertain whether
a particular resource is more valuable when consolidated into a
single large chunk (which would suggest increasing returns to scale)
or divided into smaller, scattered segments (which would suggest
the opposite).54 In environmental science, the famous SLOSS
(“single large or several small”) debate took up just this question
in the habitat context, with largely inconclusive results.55
Interconnectedness among organisms and habitats can make
fragmentation harmful and consolidation valuable,56 but smaller,
well-separated areas can provide greater diversification of risk
51. See, e.g., Lynne Gilbert-Norton et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Corridor
Effectiveness, 24 CONSERV. BIO. 660, 667 (2010).
52. The “last segment” might be any of the segments along the path, if each is essential.
53. See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 5, at 57–59; Oliver et al., supra note 32, at 525–28.
54. Similar questions crop up in land assembly contexts, where holdout dynamics can
make it difficult or impossible to tell whether component parcels are more highly valued
separately in their existing uses or aggregated for a new use. See, e.g., FENNELL, supra note
6, at 36–37.
55. See, e.g., ENRIC SALA, THE NATURE OF NATURE: WHY WE NEED THE WILD 154 (2020);
HILTY ET AL., supra note 18, at 60.
56. On the costs of fragmentation, see, e.g., SALA, supra note 55, at 153; HILTY ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 55–82; Nick M. Haddad et al., Habitat Fragmentation and Its Lasting
Impact on Earth’s Ecosystems, 1 SCI. ADV. (Mar. 20, 2015), https://advances.sciencemag.org/
content/1/2/e1500052.full.
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and may be less costly to add in already developed areas.57 Still,
we know that for many environmental goods, the whole is greater
than the sum of the parts, and relatively small changes, such as
those that break up minimum sustainable populations, can cause
disproportionate harm.58
A related problem is that even if we know that crossing a critical
line will make a large difference, it may be unclear what state of the
world that line corresponds to, or where our current state of affairs
stands relative to it. For example, we may be uncertain about the
maximum sustainable yield for a given fishery, and we may even
lack good data about actual fishing levels. In other words, we might
know that there is a cliff effect in a particular resource context, but
have no idea whether we are about to go over the cliff. Projections
that extrapolate from existing or historical data may present a false
picture where significant nonlinearities are present. As a result,
models are constantly contested and revised, and an accurate story
may emerge only after much damage has already occurred.59
Despite these caveats, the distinction between incremental and
all-or-nothing effects remains structurally significant. The lumpier
or more indivisible a given good or goal is, the less possible it is for
anyone to enjoy its benefits until the critical threshold is reached.
This does not mean that people will always cooperate to produce the
good, only that they are not categorically better off choosing not to
do so. The good may be provided or preserved in its entirety, or it
may be lost altogether. Which result will prevail? The answer
depends in part on whose cooperation is necessary to the outcome,
which brings us to participation requirements.
2. Participation Requirements
Participation requirements tell us who, exactly, must agree or
contribute in order for a particular goal to be reached.60 Where a
57. See, e.g., SALA, supra note 55, at 154 (observing that “[s]mall protected areas may
be the only practical tool in regions heavily populated by humans”); HILTY ET AL., supra note
18, at 146–63 (discussing potential drawbacks to corridors, including economic costs and “edge
effects” from long and narrow pathways).
58. Similarly, protecting a resource like a fishery incompletely may do very little good
compared with providing full protection. See, e.g., SALA, supra note 55, at 150 (“In protected
areas that allow some fishing, the fish biomass does not even double. But in fully protected
areas, the total biomass of fish is, on average, six times greater than in unprotected areas
nearby, and sharks are 15 times more abundant.”).
59. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 8, at 126–28 (discussing shifts in views about the
state of fisheries); Thompson, supra note 1, at 258–59 (noting the significance of “scientific
uncertainty” about the state of resources such as fisheries, and the tendency toward
“tremendous wishful thinking” and overly optimistic construal of ambiguity).
60. Although the discussion here focuses on the cooperation of individuals, many
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physical input like real estate is necessary to produce the good, as
in the case of a highway or wildlife corridor, cooperation must
come from those who own or control the land lying along the path.
If there is only one viable path, then every one of the people who
owns land along it must cooperate, unless there is a coercive process
like eminent domain to override their failure to cooperate. Other
situations have more flexible participation requirements—often,
merely “enough” people must cooperate, not any specific set of
actors. For example, if vaccination of 90% of a population against a
disease produces herd immunity sufficient to protect the community
as a whole, then most, but not all, people must cooperate to produce
that good.61
For common pool resources like the passenger pigeon,
participation requirements are tricky: forbearance by some people
may be met by intensified hunting from others. Everyone who is in
a position to hunt intensively can affect the outcome. By contrast,
participation requirements are quite open-ended when a monetary
goal is involved because the necessary threshold can be met by any
one person or combination of persons with the necessary funds. The
indivisibility of the good in question and the stringency of the
participation requirements tell us a great deal about who needs to
cooperate, but these factors do not tell us whether that cooperation
will occur. For that, we need to examine payoffs.
3. Payoffs
The signature feature of an indivisible good is that no one can
enjoy any increment of the good until it is supplied in full (or in some
minimally useful chunk). As a result, payoffs do not rise above
zero for anyone unless enough people cooperate (per the
participation requirements) to supply the good (or avoid the bad).
This foundationally changes the dynamics of the situation and
keeps noncooperation from being the dominant strategy under all
circumstances. Failing to cooperate could win one a higher payoff (if
it is possible to free ride on others or extract more surplus), and
cooperating could reduce one’s payoff below the initial baseline
(wasting effort futilely hunting a stag alone), but cooperating might

resource problems will require the cooperation of larger entities like firms or governments.
We might think of these situations as involving an antecedent collective action problem
among stakeholders or constituents to influence the incentives of the entities in question.
61. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 222–23 (revised
ed. 2006)
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also make the critical difference between being able to enjoy a large
indivisible good (or dodge a catastrophe) and losing out on that
opportunity altogether.
Several features determine the specifics of a given payoff
structure. If not everyone’s participation is essential to supply
the good, is it possible to exclude noncontributors from the benefits?
If the indivisible good is supplied, are the gains distributed
symmetrically (as in the Stag Hunt) or asymmetrically (as in
Chicken)? If the threshold is not reached, can those who have
contributed get their contributions back, or are those amounts
simply forfeited? If the threshold is exceeded, who (if anyone) gets
the excess? Finally, once people contribute to the good in question,
can their contributions be “raided” or eroded by noncontributors?
For example, if some fishers curtail their fishing to improve
sustainability, can a noncooperating subset of fishers intensify
their own efforts to nullify (and profit from) those efforts?
Any factor that influences how and whether contributions to the
good can be wasted, enjoyed, eroded, raided, or undone by other
actors can alter the expected payoff from cooperating. The next
sections elaborate on these and other aspects of a resource game’s
structure. The prospects for cooperation depend on one’s ability to
see this structure and predict the moves of others within it.
B. A Lumpy Public Goods Game
Research has investigated contribution decisions in stylized
experimental settings where the rules of the game are made explicit.
Of particular interest for our discussion are games in which players
must choose whether or not to contribute to a central fund, where
meeting a particular threshold of contributions will trigger the
payment of a large bonus to be distributed among all the players.
This setup replicates a lumpy public good, like finding a cure for a
disease or saving a species. The good has an all-or-nothing quality;
it generates benefits for everyone if it is provided, and no benefits
for anyone if it is not.
A standard game might involve seven players who are each
given $5 that they can contribute (entirely) or keep.62 If at least five
contribute, a bonus of $70 pays out to the group in equal shares ($10
each). But if the threshold is not reached, the contributors go home

62. See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes et al., Organizing Groups for Collective Action, 80 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1171 (1986) (presenting results of similarly structured games); Christopher
C. Fennell & Lee Anne Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax Policy: A Qualitative Research Agenda,
13 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 75, 93–100 (2003) (discussing and analyzing games involving steplevel goods).
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empty-handed. Likewise, if the contribution is exceeded, no one gets
more than their share of the bonus. Notably, players need not
engage in guesswork about production functions, participation
requirements, or payoffs. Unlike real-world resource dilemmas,
where the shape of the problem is often opaque, the experimental
game’s structure is expressly conveyed in the instructions. This
transparency immediately resolves one set of visibility problems,
but it leaves players uncertain about the strategies that other
players will pursue.
What do we expect will happen? No one can enjoy any payoffs
unless the threshold is reached, so there is some motive to
contribute. At the same time, there is a risk of losing one’s money if
the threshold is not reached, as well as an opportunity to gain even
more by hanging onto one’s money if the threshold will be reached
in any case. In an experiment similar to this, nearly two-thirds of
the players chose to contribute under such conditions.63 Is it possible
to do better? One experimental intervention involved a money-back
guarantee similar to the funding one might find on a platform like
Kickstarter: if the threshold is not reached, everyone gets their
money back. Interestingly, this did not seem to help significantly.64
On the one hand, it was reassuring to the players that they would
not lose their money if the threshold was not reached. But on the
other hand, they could also predict that the money-back feature
would reassure others, making it more likely their own contribution
would not be needed after all.65 Free riding remained a problem.
More effective was an intervention that effectively kept
noncontributors from gaining anything by defecting.66 It was
easy to accomplish this result in the experimental setting by
specifying that no one could leave with more than $10 (the share of
the bonus that each player would receive if the threshold was
reached). As long as the threshold was reached, everyone went home
63. See Dawes et al., supra note 62, at 1176–78 & tbl. 2.
64. See id. at 1175–78. There are, however, some reports of success with this method.
See id. at 1172; see also Ian Ayres, Voluntary Taxation and Beyond: The Promise of SocialContracting Voting Mechanisms, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 4–5 (2017) (discussing mixed
results of laboratory and field experiments on “provision point mechanisms” that refund
contributions if the target is not met). For further discussion of this approach and variations
on it, see generally, Julia Y. Lee, Gaining Assurances, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1137 (2012). For
an especially interesting field experiment that involved soliciting a threshold level of
contributions to preserve habitat for the Bobolink, a grassland-nesting songbird, see Stephen
K. Swallow et al., The Bobolink Project: Selling Public Goods from Ecosystem Services Using
Provision Point Mechanisms, 143 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 236 (2018) (reporting results of using
various provision point mechanisms, with money-back guarantees, to fund contracts with
farmers who would alter their haying practices to preserve nesting areas).
65. See Dawes et al., supra note 62, at 1174.
66. Id. at 1175, 1183.
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with an identical payoff, whether they chose to contribute or not.
Yet in many real-world contexts, there is no way to meaningfully
offer refunds or keep noncontributors from free riding. Efforts
expended on conservation measures generally cannot be clawed
back if those efforts fail; if they succeed, the results will be enjoyed
or shared by noncontributors as well as contributors.
What alternatives exist? One answer is to inculcate norms of
cooperation, so that people suffer shame and social stigma if they
do not cooperate, and enjoy peer approval or esteem if they do
cooperate.67 This is another way of rewarding cooperation and
punishing defection, only using non-monetary payoffs. We will
return to this possibility, and its connections to visibility, below.68
But first it is worth emphasizing a way in which self-interest alone
can solve the free-rider problem: if people are convinced that their
own contribution is essential to the outcome. When goods are
indivisible and everyone stands to benefit from their provision—or
suffer from their absence—it can be rational (in a narrow selfinterested sense) for people to contribute.69 The next section
explains.
C. The Importance of Being Essential
When goods are indivisible, each piece of the whole matters.
That can generate holdout problems, because each person who
controls an essential element has an effective veto. However,
participation requirements vary: often, the good may be supplied (or
the bad avoided), even if some people do not cooperate or contribute.
That eases the holdout problem, but introduces a second problem:
noncooperators can improve their payoff relative to cooperators by
free riding, if enough cooperators exist to provide the good.
A third problem, a sense of futility, can block progress whenever
a high threshold must be reached in order to supply a good or avoid
a bad. People may refrain from cooperating or contributing because
they feel their efforts can make no difference against such a vast
problem. Benjamin Hale describes the disabling sense of “causal
impotence” that can impede progress in the climate change
67. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
68. See infra Part IV.D.
69. See, e.g., Glenn W. Harrison & Jack Hirshleifer, An Experimental Analysis of
Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods, 97 J. POLIT. ECON. 201, 203 (1989) (“In
desperate circumstances in which each person must do his or her duty (and even more) if the
community is to survive, what appears to be self-sacrificing behavior may actually be selfishly
optimal in swinging the balance between community viability and social collapse.”).
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context,70 and other scholars have noted how “drop in the bucket”
perceptions can deter action and dissipate personal responsibility.71
As Arden Rowell and Kenworthey Bilz explain, people may distance
themselves from environmental problems by emphasizing the
insignificance of their own marginal impact: “‘It’s not like me riding
my bike to work is going to magically fix local air quality’”72
All three of these problems (holding out, free riding, and futility)
relate to the significance of being essential to producing a particular
good, whether that means putting together a physical assembly
like a wildlife corridor or highway, reaching a goal like curing a
disease or winning an election, or avoiding a catastrophic result like
species collapse. Where a good has a lumpy all-or-nothing character,
contributions toward producing it can be futile, critical, or
superfluous.73 If one’s payoffs stem only from the provision of the
good (or lack thereof), and not also from intrinsic or social rewards
from cooperating (or punishments for not cooperating), then one
would rationally contribute one’s own efforts or resources when
three conditions are met: (1) one’s contribution will be critical to the
outcome; (2) one will reap enough from the provision of the good to
more than cover the cost of contributing; and (3) it is not possible to
improve one’s payoff through strategic behavior.
In a simple two-person Stag Hunt game, these conditions are
relatively easy to meet. The participation of either party makes the
other party’s participation critical to the outcome, and the payoffs
assume that the spoils will be shared in a way that makes that
critical participation worthwhile. Futility—hunting stag alone—is
the only risk in the story, and it is entirely eliminated if the (only)
other player can be counted on to hunt stag. The cooperative
solution is assured if each party can see that the other will
cooperate. In other words, visibility alone can do the trick. This

70. Benjamin Hale, Nonrenewable Resources and the Inevitability of Outcomes, 94 THE
MONIST 369, 381–82 (2011).
71. See, e.g., Daniel Bartels & Russell C. Burnett, A Group Construal Account of Dropin-the-Bucket Thinking in Policy Preference and Moral Judgment, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCH. 50, 50–51 (2011) (discussing Peter Unger’s notion of “futility thinking” and connecting
it to “drop-in-the-bucket thinking” in which a larger denominator makes a given saving of
lives or resources seem less compelling); see also ULLMANN MARGALIT, supra note 36, at 28–
29 (discussing how the “condition of individual insignificance” can produce higher levels of
defection).
72. ROWELL & BILZ, supra note 3, at 34.
73. See Amnon Rapoport, Provision of Public Goods and the MCS Experimental
Paradigm, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 148, 149–51 (1985) (discussing payoff calculations that
depend on whether one’s will be “critical” rather than wasted or unnecessary); Dawes et al.,
supra note 62, at 1178–81 (examining probabilities of being “futile, critical, and redundant”);
see also Fennell & Fennell, supra note 62, at 93–96.
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outcome is also stable: neither party will do better defecting so long
as the other cooperates. In many real-world settings, however, at
least one of these conditions fails.
Futility often presents a large threat in many-player contexts.
Convincing people that their efforts are important—that they
will add up to something—can, counterintuitively, be approached
by asking for very little. The 1938 “March of Dimes” campaign
to eradicate polio took just this tack, soliciting a contribution
increment that was both clear and broadly attainable—one dime.74
Research on charitable contributions has found that communicating
messages like “even a penny will help” can induce more people to
contribute, at least in face-to-face solicitation settings—an effect
known as “legitimizing paltry contributions.”75 In the context of an
indivisible good, the message is only conditionally true; a penny or
a dime will not help at all, unless enough other people contribute as
well. Perhaps such solicitations send the message that the solicitors
are confident about being able to assemble a large enough chunk of
contributions to supply a large indivisible good like curing a disease.
Where not everyone’s participation is essential, the prospect
of free riding arises—assuming the good is one from which
noncontributors cannot be excluded. Here visibility might actually
seem to backfire if it enables people to see when enough others
have contributed and they can safely free ride. If everyone tries
to sit back and watch, making contributions visible might mean
that there are no contributions to see. Yet keeping contributions
hidden leaves people with no guidance about the best strategy to
pursue, other than their own assumptions about what others are
doing—assumptions that are prone to systematic distortions.76
Making choices in the dark, people may be paralyzed by a sense of
74. See Origin Of Our Name, March of Dimes, https://www.marchofdimes.org/mission/
eddie-cantor-and-the-origin-of-the-march-of-dimes.aspx.
75. See Robert B. Cialdini & David A. Schroeder, Increasing Compliance by
Legitimizing Paltry Contributions: When Even a Penny Helps, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 599 (1976); see also Indranil Goswami & Oleg Urminsky, When Should the Ask be a
Nudge? The Effect of Default Amounts on Charitable Donations, 59 J. MKTG. RESEARCH 829
(2016) (presenting results indicating that low defaults increase contribution rates, but also
cause people to scale back their contributions to the default amount).
76. The psychological study of “social projection” has identified a number of biases,
including “the false consensus effect” (assuming that one’s own behaviors or beliefs are more
prevalent than they actually are) and the “uniqueness bias” (underestimating how many
others will act as commendably as oneself when engaged in good behaviors, or overestimating
how many others will act as poorly as oneself when engaged in bad behaviors). See, e.g., Benoit
Monin & Michael Norton, Perceptions of a Fluid Consensus: Uniqueness Bias, False
Consensus, False Polarization, and Pluralistic Ignorance in a Water Conservation Crisis, 29
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 559 (2003). See also McAdams, supra note 67, at 400–
05 (discussing problems communicating a consensus and the prevalence of “false consensus”
effects).
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futility, tempted by the prospect of free riding on others, or fearful
of others free riding on them. In the absence of a regulatory
approach that requires participation, what alternatives remain?
One possibility is to construct indivisible goals that effectively
make everyone’s cooperation essential (as it is in the two-person
Stag Hunt). Samuel Popkin’s analysis of political entrepreneurship
in peasant movements offers useful insight on this point: “if a large
overall goal can be broken into many small independent pieces, all
of which are necessary, the free-rider problem can be overcome, for
if each person has a monopoly on a necessary factor for the final
goal, all contributions are essential.”77 This observation is consistent
with research findings on dilemmas that have a “weakest link”
structure in which any failure to contribute is fatal to the goal.78
Returning to the lumpy public goods game above, suppose that
every player had to contribute their $5 in order for the threshold to
be met for receiving the bonus. This makes the game easier to solve
in one way, because there is no opportunity for anyone to free
ride, but it also makes it seem riskier to contribute if people are
uncertain that others will also contribute. The prospects for
cooperation remain relatively high, however, because everyone is
in symmetrical positions with respect to contributions and payoffs;
all that is needed is mutual assurance that all will contribute.
A different dynamic occurs in many land assembly contexts.
Here, the fact that each landowner’s parcel is essential to a planned
project (a highway, say, or a major redevelopment effort) presents a
holdout problem that can thwart efforts to put the pieces together
through private sales. Such holdout problems form a primary
rationale for eminent domain, which overrides the need to assemble
cooperation from all of the landowners. Far from facilitating
cooperation, knowledge of one’s own centrality to the overall scheme
can prompt strategic behavior in attempting to gain more of the
assembly surplus. This strategizing can raise costs or even sink the
assembly altogether. Hence the observation that private developers,
who are not subject to the same transparency requirements as
governments, might be in a better position to assemble land in some
contexts because they can rely on secrecy and proxy purchasers to
obscure their assembly plans.79
Being essential, and knowing it, goes from spurring cooperation

77. SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE RATIONAL PEASANT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL
SOCIETY IN VIETNAM 257 (1979).
78. See, e.g., Harrison & Hirshleifer, supra note 33; Hawkes, supra note 38, at 288–89.
79. See Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20–24
(2006) (discussing the use of secret buying agents by Harvard and Disney to assemble land).
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in a public goods game to impeding it in the land assembly case.
Why? The answer relates to whether a player can do even better by
threatening not to cooperate. This possibility did not exist in the
stylized Stag Hunt, because cooperation involved symmetrical and
essential contributions and both players stood to get equal payoffs.
By contrast, Chicken presents the possibility that, in achieving an
indivisible good (avoiding a crash) one party wins more than the
other—facts that much more closely resemble real-world resource
dilemmas in which different parties stand to gain or lose different
amounts from realizing an indivisible goal.80
Even in Chicken, everyone finds it in their own interest to
cooperate if necessary, to avoid the crash outcome. But the game
is a dangerous one because each party wants to glean more surplus
along the way. Parties miscalculate and wind up destroying
deals that would be valuable for all concerned. Even though
visibility seems like part of the problem, it is the knowledge of
one’s own centrality to the goal coupled with misreading what the
other party will do that leads to tragedy. Refusal to swerve in
Chicken is always based on a prediction that the other party will
swerve. Where it is clear that this is not the case, swerving becomes
the best strategy. This is why one party’s unilateral precommitment
to not swerving (by tearing out the steering wheel, for example)
can ensure a win while precluding a tragic crash—but only if the
other party sees it! 81
In short, visibility can improve predictions about the behavior of
others, as well as illuminate the structure of the game that is
underway. The next Part explains how enhanced visibility can
promote cooperative rather than destructive equilibria.

80. A related possibility is that there might be two (or more) alternative goals that the
parties could pursue cooperatively, either of which would bring gains to both of them, but in
different proportions. This payoff structure tracks a standard game dubbed the Battle of the
Sexes (BOS) in which both members of a couple will gain by attending an event together but
one will gain more from attending Event A and the other will gain more from attending Event
B. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 2, at 41–42. Similarly, the hunters in our story might
coordinate on hunting stag or on hunting bison, with one player benefiting more from the
former, and the other player benefiting more from the latter. Hence, we might see a strategic
interaction over what to cooperatively hunt embedded in the decision to cooperatively hunt in
the first place (rather than just hunt rabbits alone). Cf. RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE
EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 69 (2015) (discussing instances in which
a BOS is embedded within a PD game). Environmental analogues are plentiful; progress
typically requires cooperation, but that cooperation could take a variety of different forms
with different distributive consequences.
81. See HERMAN KAHN, ON ESCALATION: METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS 11 (1965)
(describing a player’s strategy of throwing the steering wheel out the window and observing
that “[i]f his opponent is watching, he has won. If his opponent is not watching, he has a
problem . . . .”; cf. SCHELLING, supra note 46, at 24 (“if the buyer can accept an irrevocable
commitment, in a way that is unambiguously visible to the seller, he can squeeze the range of
indeterminacy down to the point most favorable to him.”).
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IV. ENHANCING VISIBILITY
Because indivisible goods have an all-or-nothing structure,
there can often be a razor’s edge dynamic in which things could
go either of two very different directions—complete success or
total failure. How can visibility tip equilibria in the direction
of conservation rather than devastation, viability rather than
extinction, sustainability rather than catastrophe? The good
news is that a problem’s indivisible structure can help catalyze
cooperation. The fact that achieving the cooperative solution is in
the interest of all concerned makes it possible for policies to work
with, rather than against, self-interest. The bad news is that
indivisible environmental problems often suffer from low visibility
along a number of dimensions. Not only is their structure often
opaque, the strategies undertaken by other players may be
impossible to observe or predict.
These two shortfalls in visibility, although conceptually distinct,
are empirically entwined in many environmental settings. The
payoffs that will flow from particular combinations of choices—
crucial to understanding the structure of the game—will often be
contested and unclear. Because human actions and resource
outcomes are often highly attenuated and temporally lagged, the
way one’s own choices combine with those of others will generally
be unknown. For similar reasons, it may be impossible to infer
what strategies others are pursuing from the current state of a
given resource system, or to guess what choices others are likely to
make next.
Both sorts of visibility challenges—seeing the problem’s
structure and seeing the strategies of others—are exacerbated by
a predicate problem: recognizing that a problem worth solving
exists in the first place. Many environmental threats are hard to
visualize because they depend on complex interactions that are
not directly observable, that are diffuse across time and space,
and that often have little immediate effect on human beings.82 It
is impossible to apprehend the structure of a problem or to predict
how others will respond to it without first recognizing it as a

82. See, e.g., ROWELL & BILZ, supra note 3, at 13 (emphasizing that environmental
problems are difficult to solve because they are diffuse, complex, and tend to impact
nonhuman species); RHETT LARSON, JUST ADD WATER 11–12 (2020) (observing that climate
change lacks resonance for many because it is framed in terms that seem inconsequential,
distant, or abstract); Elke U. Weber, Experience-Based and Description-Based Perceptions of
Long-Term Risk: Why Global Warming Does Not Scare Us (Yet), 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103,
108 (2006) (explaining why the threat of climate change does not elicit visceral reactions from
many Americans).
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problem. Although this point is not unique to indivisible resource
problems, it carries particular significance where a certain
threshold of cooperation is critical to success.
The sections below consider how we might overcome those
obstacles to enable people to put together resources and cooperation
in socially valuable ways.
A. Concretization
Problems that are vivid, concrete, immediate, and discrete
attract more attention—and are more likely to spur cooperative
action—than diffuse, distant, and abstract threats. One
manifestation of this tendency is found in the psychological
preference for helping specific “identifiable victims” over larger
numbers of undifferentiated people or “statistical lives.”83 That
environmental concerns often involve long-run harms to large
numbers of unidentified people (many of whom are not yet born)
presents a policy challenge.84 Similarly, conservation resources are
disproportionately directed toward “charismatic megafauna” like
tigers or polar bears over species that are less visible or harder to
identify with, like insects, fish, or invertebrates.85 Resource threats
that are entirely invisible, like greenhouse gases, or that are
masked by the mobility of the resource units, as in the case of the
passenger pigeon, may escape attention altogether.86
Although these tendencies seem like cognitive biases or
errors, we can also understand them as rational reactions to
coordination problems that depend on attracting the attention—and
cooperation—of others. A stag hunt is a compelling metaphor for a
coordination game because it features a visible, concrete, well83. See, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, CHOICE AND
CONSEQUENCE 113, 115 (1984); Cynthia Cryder and George Loewenstein, The Critical Link
Between Tangibility and Generosity, in THE SCIENCE OF GIVING: EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES
TO THE STUDY OF CHARITY 237 (Daniel M. Oppenheimer and Christopher Y. Olivola, eds.,
2010).
84. See e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FLA. ST.
L. REV. 433 (2008).
85. See, e.g., ROWELL & BILZ, supra note 3, at 198–203; Andrew Metrick & Martin L.
Weitzman, Patterns of Behavior in Endangered Species Preservation, 72 LAND ECON. 1 (1996).
86. See, e.g., ROWELL & BILZ, supra note 3, at 38 (“[Pollutants’] diffuse, invisible nature
makes it hard to take them seriously—we tend to forget their effects or their importance in
favor of more immediate, visible phenomena.”); Edella Schlager et al., Mobile Flows, Storage,
and Self-Organized Institutions for Governing Common-Pool Resources, 70 LAND ECON. 294,
297–98 (1994) (detailing the informational challenges presented by mobile resource flows,
including the difficulty of assessing declines and connecting them with harvesting behavior,
and the resulting dampening of incentives to take corrective action); Graham Epstein et al.,
Governing the Invisible Commons: Ozone Regulation and the Montreal Protocol, 8 INT’L J.
COMMONS 337, 347 (2014) (noting the problems presented by the mobility and invisibility of
ozone and ozone-depleting substances).
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defined objective that two players can completely achieve if they
work together. There is no similarly stylized game for addressing
the long-range effects of incremental sea rise or the chain reactions
that accompany diminutions in biodiversity. People may perceive
that their efforts are best directed towards problems that are
compelling enough to also appear on the radars of many other
people.
We need not take problems as we find them, however. The way
in which issues and contributions are framed can add concreteness
and immediacy to situations that might otherwise appear
hopelessly vague and abstract. Charitable organizations, well
aware of the power of framing, employ a variety of strategies to
make problems appear concrete and their solutions achievable.
The idea of “symbolically adopting” or sponsoring a particular
animal, or funding some specific need (acquisition of a certain
increment of habitat space, for example), can turn large and
abstract problems into a series of discrete and solvable ones.
The more visible these targeted efforts appear, the more confidence
they will inspire in would-be contributors that others will similarly
contribute.
A compelling image can help supply this type of visibility. For
example, a recent online news feature used infrared images to show
methane gas emissions—a form of pollution that is otherwise
invisible to the naked eye.87 Vivid manifestations of problems that
are otherwise hard to access visually can also attract attention and
mobilize support for solutions. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil
spill, a massive leak in a BP-operated well 5,000 feet underwater,
became urgently real to many people only after BP released an
underwater video feed showing the leak gushing forth in real time.
As Barack Obama explains, “Suddenly people around the world
could see the oil pulsing in thick columns from the surrounding
wreckage.”88
Interestingly, the high degree of connectivity among resources—
their very indivisibility—often works in favor of approaches that
focus on their most highly salient features. A keystone species, for
example, can serve as a bellwether for how a larger ecosystem is
doing as well as a visceral representation of the stakes involved.89 A
87. See Jonah M. Kessel and Hiroko Tabuchi, It’s a Vast, Invisible Climate Menace. We
Made It Visible, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/12/
climate/texas-methane-super-emitters.html.
88. BARACK OBAMA, A PROMISED LAND 568 (2020).
89. See SALA, supra note 55, at 81 (citing Robert T. Paine for the idea of a “keystone
species” which “has an effect on the entire ecosystem” that “is disproportionately greater than
its abundance.”).
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simple, periodic measure of some visible attribute—the measured
clarity of Lake Tahoe, for example90—can stand in for tomes of
detailed data about how development, runoff, and micro-organisms
relate to each other. Having concrete, solvable problems stand in for
larger and more abstract ones has another advantage: it enables
people to signal their willingness to cooperate in the larger
enterprise.91 In short, we should look for ways to use the visible to
leverage the invisible.
In the climate change context, for example, researchers have
noted the potential value of focusing policy attention on “coemissions”—ambient air pollution that accompanies carbon dioxide
emissions but that has localized, near-term health effects.92
Building mitigation efforts around these more tangible and
immediate impacts can help make headway on the larger and more
abstract problem of carbon emissions as well. Rhett Larson suggests
another interesting concretization move: shifting the focus of
environmental discourse from climate change to water security.93
The two are related, but the latter concretely affects people’s lives
in ways that tend to be more visible and immediate.94 Coordinating
to address water issues that will have a direct impact on people’s
lives today can both further larger sustainability goals and provide
a workable platform for coordinating toward larger efforts.
Yet even water may prove an insufficiently visible resource in
some contexts. Interestingly, droughts and water shortages may be
more visible in places that generally have ample surface water
supplies, as Kate Pride Brown points out, because it is possible to
actually observe changes in water levels.95 She notes that people in
Atlanta are better able to “see” water scarcity than people in a
90. Lake clarity is measured annually by lowering a white Secchi disc into the lake to
determine the depth at which it remains visible. U.C. Davis, Tahoe Environmental Research
Center, Tahoe: State of the Lake 2020, (2020), https://tahoe.ucdavis.edu/sites/g/files/
dgvnsk4286/files/inline-files/2020_SOTL_Complete.pdf
91. See SCHELLING, supra note 46, at 112 (explaining how a focal point may be “a small
piece of the game that comes to symbolize the game itself, setting a pattern of expectations
that extends beyond the substance of the point involved”). Similarly, a visible practice can
serve as a signal of compliance with related but less visible norms, potentially spurring
broader compliance with even the less visible norms. See McAdams, supra note 67, at 415
n.259 (“If a visible test reliably predicts compliance with a norm for which violations are more
difficult to detect, and the latter norm benefits the group, then the group may be better off
having the former norm.”).
92. See Drew Shindell et al., Quantified, Localized Health Benefits of Accelerated
Carbon Dioxide Emissions Reductions, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 291 (2018). I thank Hajin
Kim for this example.
93. LARSON, supra note 82, at 11–29.
94. See id.
95. Brown, supra note 3.
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desert environment like Phoenix that relies on groundwater that is
out of sight—making its scarcity invisible. Here too, conscious
efforts at improving visibility may become important. For example,
San Antonio has been able to consciously raise the visibility of its
groundwater supply by including the Edwards aquifer level in daily
weather reports.96 This example connects to a second approach to
problems of visibility: finding ways to provide observable feedback
about the changing state of a resource system.
B. Feedback
Solving collective action problems requires perceiving causal
connections between individual decisions and the results that play
out in the world. In stylized games or simple physical interactions,
players receive immediate, tangible feedback about the effects of
their decisions.97 But in many resource settings, these connections
are opaque or attenuated.
Extreme forms of attenuation between acts and outcomes
prevail in many environmental contexts. As Rowell and Bilz
explain, “[i]n a literal and figurative sense, . . . it is impossible
for individuals to ‘see’ the impacts of their climate behaviors on
the global climate.”98 Globalization contributes to what Richard
Lazarus has called “a cognitive severance of environmental cause
and effect.”99 Those making decisions with environmental impacts
frequently do not have to live with, or in some cases even know
about, the negative effects of their actions. As Lazarus explains,
“American consumers . . . could not readily perceive the
environmental impact of their purchasing decisions, as the impact
on the world environment was effectively masked by distance.”100
In addition to being spatially distant and causally attenuated,
environmental impacts may be dispersed in ways that make them
hard to track, as in the case of the passenger pigeon.101
When feedback comes too slowly, coordination can fail
dramatically, especially where indivisible goods are concerned.
Schelling illustrates the effects of lagged feedback with the example

96. See id. at 230–31.
97. See, e.g., MCADAMS, supra note 80, at 5–6 (explaining how the center line on a road
“gives immediate feedback on far it is safe to venture in that direction”).
98. ROWELL & BILZ, supra note 3, at 232.
99. LAZARUS, supra note 24, at 213.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
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of a sightseeing boat that encounters a group of porpoises.102 The
passengers all rush to one railing to view the porpoises, which soon
causes the ship to tilt dangerously to one side. Fearing the boat will
capsize, all of the passengers rush to the opposite railing. But their
initial relief—the deck is leveling out!—turns quickly to terror when
they understand that the ship is now tilting even more violently
(due to momentum) in the opposite direction.103 Capsizing is an allor-nothing event that everyone in the boat has an interest in
avoiding, but their concerted action may actually bring it about.
As this example suggests, if we wait for observable feedback
from the physical world about the aggregate effects of our individual
choices, it may be too late to salvage the situation. If we can help
people see what is happening sooner, and how it connects to
individual choices, it becomes easier to avert disaster. Even a simple
metric—the daily information about aquifer levels mentioned above,
for example—can help people recognize shortages and calibrate
their conservation efforts accordingly. In one influential study, the
ability to see resource units declining in a simulated replenishing
resource game helped move participants closer to an optimal
harvesting strategy.104
Some forms of feedback enable people to monitor the impact of
their own choices, such as data about household energy usage and
how it compares to that of one’s neighbors.105 Because people tend
to view their own acts through a self-biased lens, even those who
mean to act fairly may unwittingly take more than their share.106
Left to guess about how one’s behavior measures up to that
of others, people tend to mentally amplify their own positive
contributions or minimize their negative impacts. Objective data
about how one’s choices measure up can act like a mirror to correct
misimpressions about conduct and encourage better choices.107
102. SCHELLING, supra note 61, at 85.
103. Id.
104. Cass & Edney, supra note 1.
105. See, e.g., Ian Ayres et al., Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer
Comparison Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 992
(2013); Hunt Allcott, Social Norms and Energy Conservation, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1082, 1087,
1090–91 (2011) (finding modest average reductions in energy conservation through a system
of providing feedback about how a household’s usage compared to its neighbors, with
significant heterogeneity, and with decay over time).
106. See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM.
ECON. REV. 1337 (1995) (examining self-serving evaluations of fairness in the settlement
context); Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni et al., Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness in
Asymmetric, Environmental Social Dilemmas: Explaining Harvesting Behavior and the Role
of Communication 67 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 111 (1996)
(finding egocentric biases in a simulated resource dilemma); Thompson, supra note 1, at 260.
107. See Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3870832

Spring, 2021

VISIBILITY AND INDIVISIBILITY

29

Feedback can even be built into the resource environment itself,
whether through resource units that are segmented in some way or
standardized harvesting equipment (a particular type of net,
for example) that facilitates metering and self-monitoring.108
Making problems and their connections to human decisions
more visible and salient does not always result in a cooperative
outcome, however. In some contexts, understanding the game more
clearly might make people behave even more selfishly (so as to get
more of the resource before things collapse altogether). But, as we
have seen, it can actually serve one’s narrow self-interest to act
cooperatively in contexts involving indivisible goods—although this
depends crucially on what others will do. This brings us to a third
approach to enhancing visibility: constructing focal points that
enable people to more accurately predict the strategies others will
adopt.
C. Focal Points
Focal points can help people coordinate their responses to
achieve indivisible goals.109 Consider a pure coordination game:
deciding which side of the road to drive on.110 No one needs to appeal
to legal enforcement or even shared norms to make people cooperate
by sticking to the appropriate side of the road; self-interest can do
the job quite nicely. Getting everyone to coordinate in this manner
creates an indivisible good of safe travel, and it is in everyone’s
interest to contribute to providing it. All that is necessary is a
focal point that enables everyone to coordinate their actions.111
The law—even without enforcement—can serve as that focal
point.112 So too could any highly visible signal, sign, or feature of
the environment.113
A simple signal or announced rule is sufficient in the driving
setting because the terms of the game are clear: the stakes are high,
everyone’s cooperation is essential, no one has anything to gain by
defecting (or threatening to), and the effects of noncooperation are
1245, 1257–58 & n.46 (2005) (citing studies on the effects that actual mirrors have on
behavior).
108. See Lee Anne Fennell, Slicing Spontaneity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2365, 2369–71 (2015).
109. Thomas Schelling famously developed the idea of focal points. See SCHELLING,
supra note 46, at 53–118.
110. See, e.g., MCADAMS, supra note 80, at 22–23 (discussing this “classic example”).
111. See id.
112 Id.
113. See, e.g., id. at 23–26 (describing how a visible “Bystander” with no formal authority
can successfully direct traffic in an intersection); FENNELL, supra note 6, at 60–61 (discussing
how physical segmentation can serve as a focal point).
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straightforward and evident to all. In other words, the problem, its
structure, and its basic solution (choose a side) are already visible,
and all that is needed is some basis for predicting what others will
do. A clear, shared focal point provides that basis.
As the “focal” metaphor suggests, these points of reference must
be visible and salient to the participants in a given collective action
game. They need not be announced in advance if shared knowledge
or other clues can make a certain reference point stand out within
a particular community. Thomas Schelling famously posed the
problem of when and where to meet in New York City on a given
day if there was no chance to coordinate: the most popular response
was Grand Central Station at noon.114 Some feature of the landscape
that stands out can help people to match their strategies, even when
their interests are at least partially in conflict. For this reason
certain solutions like splitting things 50-50 can stand out and
enable deal-making by resisting small shifts in either direction that
would unravel consensus.115
Similarly, a focal solution can emerge organically out of a
situation involving shared resources if there is an obvious basis for
making an allocation. For example, ten friends who meet regularly
and share a plate of twenty shrimp may naturally fixate on the
solution of eating two shrimp per person (a choice made easier by
the readily divisible number of shrimp, the discreteness of the
shrimp units, and the tails that serve as reminders of one’s
consumption tally).116 This solution is by no means guaranteed:
the situation may instead devolve into a free-for-all.117 But the
prospects for cooperation get a boost when players can quickly
identify an easy-to-implement strategy that everyone can observe
as it unfolds. Not only can participants readily see what strategy
others are pursuing, they can also keep tabs on how their own
consumption compares.
Some visible actions can serve as proof of investments made
toward a cooperative strategy. Imagine, for example, that a
particular piece of clothing or equipment was essential to hunting
stag, so that wearing or carrying that item would credibly
communicate to others that one was planning to hunt stag rather
than chase rabbits. Here it becomes interesting to consider what
114. SCHELLING, supra note 46, at 55.
115. See id. at 71–72.
116. See LEWIS, supra note 37, at 96; FENNELL, supra note 6, at 54.
117. See LEWIS, supra note 37, at 96 (noting that the shrimp situation has two stable
solutions: a “social contract” or a “state of nature” in which participants grab all they can as
quickly as they can).
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kinds of cooperative strategies are visible to others or can be made
so with the right framing devices.118 Consider the push to make
brown lawns a source of pride during a drought—a strategy that the
City of Santa Barbara pursued some years ago.119 One’s brown lawn
evinced cooperation and elicited more cooperation from others. By
making the brown lawn trendy, social norms and pressures could
push in a conservation direction.120
Contrast this situation with a sudden water shortage at
Stanford that led the campus to call for students to cease showering
for roughly three days.121 Unlike the brown lawn, which is highly
visible and public, showering is conducted in private and is not
observable to others. A study of this situation found systematic
misperceptions about what others were doing. For example,
students who showered during the water crisis tended to believe
that others were showering to a greater extent than did students
who did not shower.122 It would have been interesting to see whether
some visible marker (an ink stamp on the forearm that would
readily wash off during showering, perhaps, or a wristband that
would disintegrate with prolonged contact with water) would have
made a difference in behavior by correcting beliefs about the
behavior of others.
Where the visibility of a practice is central to solving a
resource dilemma, invisible cooperation can be unhelpful or even
counterproductive. For example, some homeowners have resorted to
painting their lawns green during droughts.123 This enables those
118. See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Conservation Game, 20 HARV. J. OF L. &
PUB. POL’Y 733, 756–57 (1997) (discussing the importance of visibility in promoting
cooperation and observing that certain actions with respect to historic preservation, like
demolishing a building, are highly visible).
119. See Jeremy Chow, Gold Is the New Green: Thinking Environmental Shame in
Drought Times, 6 RESILIENCE 1 (2018).
120. Scholars have recognized the role of visibility in promoting the spread of social
norms. See, e.g., Maria Knight Lapinski & Rajiv N. Rimal, An Explication of Social Norms,
15 COMMUNICATION THEORY 127, 141–43 (2005); Patrice Wylly, Evaluating the Costs of
Technology Neutrality in Light of the Importance of Social Network Influences and
Bandwagon Effects for Innovation Diffusion, 23 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 298, 341–49 (2015); Jed
S. Ela, Law and Norms in Collective Action: Maximizing Social Influence to Minimize Carbon
Emissions, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93, 123–43 (2009); McAdams, supra note 67, at 361
(describing how the “risk of detection” contributes to the development of norms). But see
Wokje Abrahamse & Linda Steg, Social Influence Approaches to Encourage Resource
Conservation, 23 GLOBAL ENV’T CHANGE 1773 (2013) (in a meta-analysis of social influence
approaches, finding that “[a] social influence approach was no more or less effective for
observable behaviours compared to behaviours that are less observable”). These findings
suggest that where other forms of direct social influence are present, visibility in the form of
observable behavior may not make a marginal difference.
121. See Monin & Norton, supra note 76.
122. Id.
123. See Amy Graff, More Californians Painting Their Lawns Green, SFGate, (May 14,
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who are actually pursuing the conservation strategy to enjoy
the aesthetic benefits of failing to do so, but it masks the prevalence
of cooperation. It likewise provides protective cover for noncooperators—shaming people for having green lawns may misfire
if some of the green lawns are really brown lawns that have been
dyed. Similar points might be made about plant-based food that
looks like meat, synthetics that look like fur or leather, and so on.
These innovations can make it easier for people to opt for what
might be regarded as the more sustainable or “cooperative” path
but, by allowing cooperators to blend in with noncooperators, can
also reduce the visibility of their choice in ways that may keep it
from gaining ground.
More broadly, the phenomenon of “conspicuous conservation”—
a counterpoint to earlier forms of “conspicuous consumption”—has
received attention.124 Bright blue recycling bins, “I Voted” stickers
(and similar stickers for being vaccinated against COVID-19),125 and
distinctively shaped electric cars all can help make a particular
practice visible.126 Having a centralized source of visible information
about the strategies that others are pursuing can also help spur
what Robert Frank has called “behavioral contagion.”127 Frank gives
the example of Google’s Project Sunroof, which lets people easily see
who has installed solar panels—a source of information that can
both document and encourage the spread of the practice.128
One concern with prioritizing visibility is that it might lead
people to fixate unduly on following a practice that is highly visible,
to the detriment of alternative approaches that are actually more
2015,
https://blog.sfgate.com/stew/2015/05/14/more-californians-painting-their-dry-lawnsgreen/.
124. The concept of “conspicuous consumption” comes from THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE
THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899). For a recent discussion, see Nestor M. Davidson,
Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2009). On “conspicuous conservation,”
see, e.g., Steven E. Sexton & Alison L. Sexton, Conspicuous Conservation: The Prius Halo and
Willingness to Pay for Environmental Bona Fides, 67 J. ENVIRON. ECON. & MGT 303 (2014);
Vladas Griskevicius et al., Going Green to Be Seen: Status, Reputation, and Conspicuous
Conservation, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 392 (2010).
125. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) has released sticker designs that proclaim,
“I Got My COVID-19 Vaccine!” Communication Resources for COVID-19 Vaccines, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/resource-center.html#printablestickers.
126. See, e.g., Griskevicius et al., supra note 125, at 399 (observing that “the highly
visible and easily identifiable Toyota Prius . . . essentially functions as a mobile, selfpromoting billboard for proenvironmentalism”); Wylly, supra note 121, at 342 (observing that
the Prius was “purposefully contrived to be visible”).
127. ROBERT H. FRANK, UNDER THE INFLUENCE: PUTTING PEER PRESSURE TO WORK 156
(2020).
128. Id. at 156–57 (discussing Google’s Project Sunroof, https://www.google.com/get/
sunroof).
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effective (or less costly and equally effective) but that operate out of
sight. For example, some people might more effectively reduce their
carbon footprints or their water consumption through means other
than solar panels or brown lawns. One response would be to find
ways to make less visible practices focal for subsets of the population
that value them (for example, gardeners who find other ways to
support sustainable water use practices), through informationsharing mechanisms.129 Although there are no doubt limits to
how much can be made focal, given the limits of human attention,
the takeaway is not that we should rally around whatever practices
happen to be most visible now. Rather, considering how existing
forms of visibility support coordination can help us more
thoughtfully construct focal points.
D. Social Norms and Self Interest
Much of the scholarly discussion around visibility has focused on
its capacity to activate and spread social norms.130 As the examples
above suggest, conservation norms can catch on as people observe
others adopting them.131 Despite concerns about faux signaling that
does not correspond to real behavioral changes (as well as worries
about being perceived to engage in such insincere behavior),132
visibility enhancing measures can serve as an important form of
norm entrepreneurship.133 But, importantly, norms are not the only
moving part in the story, when it comes to achieving indivisible
goals. Narrow self-interest can also help to support cooperation even
in the absence of shared norms, as we have seen already. How do
these two factors combine?
Where a practice (recycling, say) is indeed backed by shared
norms, people who follow the practice may receive an immediate
payoff in the form of esteem from others or a sense of pride in having

129. I thank Richard McAdams for conversations on this point.
130. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. See also Gregg Sparkman and Gregory
M. Walton, Dynamic Norms Promote Sustainable Behavior, Even if It Is Counternormative,
28 PSYCH. SCI. 1663, 1673 (2017) (observing that a changing trend can push people to adopt
practices (like eating less meat) that diverge from current prevailing practices “[i]f this change
is visible, appears willful, reflects the importance of the issue, and is taken as a sign of what
is to come”).
131. Visibility can also activate existing norms by enabling self-monitoring that makes
one’s own acts clearer. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Jonathan Z. Berman, The Braggart’s Dilemma: On the Social Rewards and
Penalties of Advertising Prosocial Behavior, 52 J. MKTG. RES. 90 (2015).
133. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929
(1996).
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done the right thing.134 This payoff helps support the cooperative
move even where it is not likely to be pivotal to achieving a lumpy
shared goal (such as preserving a species). Put in terms of our
stylized games, it is as if hunting stag becomes inherently more
rewarding as an activity than chasing rabbits (whether or not any
stag are brought down), or as if one earns honor in a game of
Chicken from swerving rather than driving straight. In other words,
it changes the payoffs of the cooperative strategy even in the event
the other person does not also cooperate. In this way, widely shared
norms can promote unconditional cooperation within a particular
interaction.135
Making contributory efforts feel independently worthwhile as a
matter of principle thus offers a way to square small concrete steps
with large indivisible goals. In the context of voting, the notion of
doing one’s civic duty for internally compelling reasons helps to
overcome the sense that it is irrational to bother when one’s chance
of making a difference is so remote.136 Benjamin Hale has
recommended a similar approach in the climate change context: by
individually taking steps that are deemed worthwhile for their own
sake, people may be able to collectively stave off some of the worst
outcomes.137 Indivisibilities in social norms themselves—the fact
that they are generally adopted in “lumps” rather than picked up
and discarded situation by situation—can allow small visible acts to
stand in for larger commitments.138
The other channel through which visible practices work to
promote cooperation relies not on shared norms but rather on
enabling people to better observe or predict whether other players
are choosing the cooperative strategy. Such insights provide no
traction in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game because one’s best choice
(under the strict assumptions of the game’s payoffs, and assuming
no repeat play) does not depend on what others do; defection is
always best.139 But in differently structured games like the Stag
134. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 76, at 380–81; cf. ULLMANN-MARGALIT, supra note
36, at 37 (describing how factors like esteem and dishonor alter payoffs for soldiers
confronting a strategic dilemma).
135. This cooperation remains contingent on norms being widely enough shared and
adopted in the relevant society to generate payoffs that favor cooperation regardless of the
specific moves of the other player.
136. See Hale, supra note 70, at 381, 386 (discussing the “paradox of voting” identified
in ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957)).
137. Id. at 386.
138. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. For discussion of drawbacks of lumpiness
in norms, see Adrian Vermuele, The Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory, 96 VA. L.
REV. 1417, 1431–38 (2010).
139. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
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Hunt or Chicken, one’s best strategy (on a purely rational calculus)
depends on what the other players are going to do. In those
game structures, a better payoff from cooperation arises not
unconditionally (as it does in the case of norm-following) but
rather conditionally, based on how one’s own choices combine with
those of others.140
Where an indivisible good is involved, being able to see others’
strategies can avoid disaster, but it can also help some parties take
advantage of others to reap larger rewards. Fearing being suckered,
parties may miscalculate and wind up contributing to a disaster.
Norms that make the cooperative action independently attractive
(or that allow for a form of “punishment” of defectors through
shaming or withholding esteem) can therefore backstop self-interest
in ways that support cooperation.
E. Putting it All Together
Concretization, feedback, focal points, and norms can all
leverage visibility to produce indivisible goods and avoid indivisible
bads. But they work best in combination. The core challenge of many
large, intractable problems is to get people to see how their many
small interacting decisions can change the world. This requires two
kinds of vision: seeing the structure of problems clearly, and seeing
how one’s own choices can combine with those of others to solve
them. Developing these ways of seeing is not costless, however.
Solving resource dilemmas on the ground requires solving a
second-order collective action problem: building platforms and
technologies that can enable people to view problems concretely and
coordinate strategies. What is required is widespread investment in
configuration entrepreneurship—the art and science of putting
resources and cooperation together in their most valuable
combinations.141
Modern technology offers ample tools for innovating in the
configuration space, as many existing and emerging models attest—
from Airbnb to Zipcar, from Groupon to Kickstarter. The same
moving parts can be used to make resource problems concrete, offer
focal solutions, and provide real-time feedback on progress.
Mechanisms for dividing up contributions to common goals into
slices that people are willing and able to provide can combat the
sense that one’s own choices are too insubstantial to matter by

140. See supra Part II.B.
141. See FENNELL, supra note 6, at 2.
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making the power of aggregation visible.
Consider the emerging consensus that one of the most useful
measures that ordinary people can take against climate change
involves a shift in dietary habits.142 Plant-based diets dramatically
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Yet going fully vegetarian or
vegan, framed as an all-or-nothing proposition, may be too large a
step for many meat eaters. Nonetheless, a much smaller dietary
shift could have a tremendous cumulative effect when multiplied by
hundreds of thousands of people. In this vein, some have advocated
part-time vegetarianism or other forms of “flexitarian” diets.143 But
these calls would be more successful if people could actually see how
their small contributions combine with those of others to produce
concrete change.144
Imagine, following an idea proposed by Matt Johnson, a “build a
vegan” site on which people could commit to giving up meat for some
portion of a day or week in order to assemble together the dietary
equivalent of a person shifting entirely to a meatless diet.145 As the
number of plant-based virtual people grew, graphics might show
how these gains translate into influencing real metrics, like ice cap
melt or sea level rise, with impacts on people’s lives or on the
survival of high-profile animals like polar bears. Once people can
see how changes translate into results (even through a virtual
representation) such a site could become focal. Many variations
on these ideas are of course possible. The central point is that
enhancing visibility to support cooperation is within our reach. The
key is developing tools that help people see what they can do.
V. CONCLUSION
Resource dilemmas often seem intractable. Although the
stakes are high, environmental impacts, and their connection to
innumerable small, interacting, individual decisions, can be hard

142. See, e.g., Lingxi Chenyang, Is Meat the New Tobacco? Regulating Food Demand in
the Age of Climate Change, 40 ENVT’L L. REPORTER 10344–45.
143. See, e.g., SALA, supra note 55, at 214–15 (noting the environmental advantages
of “[a] ‘flexitarian’ diet based mostly on plants, with occasional meat consumption”);
Ian Ayres, Vegetarianism as a Sometimes Thing, Freakonomics, (June 19, 2009), http://
freakonomics.com/2009/06/19/vegetarianism-as-a-sometimes-thing/ (presenting a one-day-aweek-vegetarian idea suggested by Matt Johnson).
144. Cf. Sparkman & Walton, supra note 131 (investigating how “dynamic norms”—the
knowledge of a growing trend, even if not yet a dominant practice—might support reduced
meat consumption).
145. Johnson explained his idea this way: “[S]ay a group of 7 people signed a contract
saying that each of them would go meatless on an assigned day each week. Thus, within the
group each member could eat meat 6 days a week, but there would be one vegetarian at all
times.” Ayres, supra note 144 (quoting Johnson).
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to pin down. It is easy to assume that tragedy will prevail, at least
in contexts where coercion is unlikely to be feasible or availing. But
one underappreciated factor—the indivisibility of many of the
relevant goods and bads—dramatically changes the game from one
in which everyone is always better off defecting to one in which
winning strategies depend crucially on expectations about the
behavior of others.
By no means is cooperation assured: things can go very badly
indeed where cliff effects and all-or-nothing dynamics are involved.
Yet the potential exists for people to coordinate their decisions,
avoid tragedy, and achieve sustainable results. Visibility, I argue, is
a key lever for making cooperation work under conditions of
indivisibility. And the fact that both indivisibility and visibility can
contribute to cooperative solutions means that we can actively work
to frame resource dilemmas around these features.
In a sense, visibility is a metaphor for perception and
understanding—seeing the problem as a problem, perceiving its
structure, and understanding the connection between individual
decisions and outcomes. But visibility is also literal. Resource
problems that provide visceral feedback can be used to coordinate
action. Harvesting methods or conservation practices that enable
observation and monitoring can assist in generating and sustaining
cooperation. Focal points, which often rely on visible features, can
give rise to shared expectations about actions.
For all its power, visibility is not a panacea. It can even backfire
in some contexts by allowing people to see opportunities to gain from
noncooperative behavior. But recognizing where and how it works
can shed new light on how to approach our most important—and
most indivisible—problems.
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